This paper defends a pragmatic and structuralist account of scientific representation of the kind recently proposed by Bas van Fraassen. As I show, the account appears to have the unacceptable consequence that the domain of a theory is restricted to phenomena for which we actually have constructed a model-a worry arising from the account's pragmatism, which is exacerbated by its structuralism. Yet the account has the resources at least partially to address the worry. What remains as implication is a strong anti--foundationalism.
The classical point--charge model for an electric charge can illustrate all three types of feature: We take it that the 1/r 2 --dependence of the electric field posited in the model accurately represents the actual field dependence. The model represents charges as point particles, which is usually taken to be an idealization, but arguably the model does not represent electric charges as having infinite mass and self--energy (for otherwise it would represent charges as objects that cannot be moved by any finite external force). The infinities of the model are mathematical inconveniences that arguably play no representation role in how the model is used. 2 The success of a scientific representation depends on a selective likeness between the representation and its target: what a representation r represents its target t as, needs to be appropriately similar to the target. And again which aspects of the representation are relevant to judging its likeness to the target and what counts as sufficiently similar for success depends on the context in which the representation is used and can change from context to context. Thus, one and the same scientific model can provide an adequate or successful representation of an object in some contexts but not in others.
Representation, then, is best thought of not as a two--place relation but rather as a multi--place relation, which includes a place for the user of the representation and for its context, aim, or purpose. If we take aims and purposes to be implicit in the context, we can construe representation as a four--place relation: a is a representation of b, exactly if there is some context c in which a user u uses a to represent b. 3 2 A partial structure approach is tailor--made to capture the various roles that properties and relations of a model can play. My claim here is that which partial structure adequately captures the representational content of a given scientific representation is determined by pragmatic and context--dependent factors. 3 Similarly, Ronald Giere has proposed to understand scientific representation in terms of the following four--place relation: 'S uses X to represent W for purposes P' (Giere 2006, 60) .
No perfect model
Van Fraassen argues that just as partial resemblance can figure in successful representation distortion, or selective non--resemblance plays an important role as well. As a scientific example he discusses the fact that classical physics represents objects as having sharp boundaries. Already the very idea of the true and exact shape and the true and precise boundaries of a macroscopic physical object might strike one as suspect. More troubling, sharp boundaries in a mathematical model often result in discontinuities or singularities, where the physics used to represent a system's behavior sufficiently far away from the boundaries breaks down. Thus, representing objects as having sharp boundaries could not possibly be completely accurate and non--distorting, at least if they involve singularities, nevertheless such representations fulfill an important role in our scientific image of the world and may in certain contexts provide us with the only means to construct useful representation of certain phenomena.
Sometimes there are techniques to patch over what happens at such boundaries, but often not in ways that allow for a single unified representation of the system. Mark
Wilson's book (Wilson 2008) is replete with fascinating examples of how our representational practices in classical physics have to distort to be successful at all, representing phenomena by partially overlapping yet in some sense incompatible 'theory façades', breaking down at the fault lines between the façades. The situation here is in certain respects analogous to multi--perspectival paintings by artists like Picasso, which bring together on a single canvas different perspectives on different parts of the human body, without, however, being able to combine these multiple perspectives into yet another unifying perspective (see also van Fraassen 2008, 38) . forcefully against what he calls "the perfect model model"-that is, the view that our best scientific theories provide use with complete and perfectly accurate models of physical phenomena, or at least that physics is progressing toward and aiming at developing ever I take Giere's proposal to be implied by my perhaps slightly broader suggestion: purposes can be understood to be given by contexts. more complete and accurate and non--distorting models of the world. Teller argues that this view of physics is mistaken and emphasizes in its stead the importance of highly idealized models. Idealized models distort in that they represent only some aspects of the physical system modeled while leaving out other aspects and may purposefully misrepresent some of the aspects represented. According to some of Teller's arguments, which I want to amplify here, distorting models at the very least play an important explanatory role and would not be rendered explanatorily superfluous by complete and perfect models. But there are even stronger arguments that suggest that the idea that physics even in principle presents us with perfect models of the phenomena is a myth and that all scientific representations are distorting.
Teller illustrates the importance of distorting models by pointing to different ways in which physicists model different aspects of the behavior of water. Continuum models can correctly represent the wave behavior of water, whereas particle models are used to represent diffusive behavior. While both kinds of model represent certain aspects of the behavior of water sufficiently accurately, neither type constitutes a perfect model of water that can successfully represent all of its properties. And both types of model manage to capture aspects of the behavior of water by distorting, by representing water either as a continuum or as a collection of classical particles. The example, thus, supports the claim that given the way our world is, for many physical systems, at least, there is no single model of the system that allows us successfully to represent the system in any kind of circumstance and we need to employ different, and even in some sense incompatible models to represent successfully different aspects of the system's behavior. Now, one might reply to Teller's example by arguing that in addition to these two types of models there exists a third type-quantum mechanical models-that do provide us with perfect, non--distorting representations of water and that can unify the two classical types of model by showing how both can be approximately derived from the correct and complete micro--theory by taking appropriate limits. This reply can be read as arguing either against the claim that the idealized models are explanatorily ineliminable or against the claim that all models in physics are distorting. I want to focus on the issue of explanatoriness first. context, while the same variables may be adding irrelevant details in another. The best explanation is one that scores best on some weighted average of these criteria, where again there is no context--independent algorithm for computing this average.
A consequence of this account is that an explanation that is more accurate than all of its rivals need not be the best explanation of a phenomenon. In fact, in most contexts it will be case that a microscopic quantum--mechanical account of the state of all the molecules composing the water will be taken to offer much too much unnecessary details for successfully explaining the water's wave--like behavior. Thus, in most explanatory contexts a full microscopic quantum mechanical model would be explanatorily inferior to the classical model even if per impossible we were able to cognitively grasp the details of the former model. What is crucial for an understanding of the behavior of water waves (in most contexts) is an understanding of the general patterns that transcend the details of the given case-patterns that arguably would be lost in the minute details of a quantum mechanical model with on the order of 10 25 variables and that transcend the details of a putatively quantum mechanical micro--model. Thus, even if we were to grant that quantum mechanics provides us, at least in principle, with a perfect model of the behavior of water, this would not render the distorting models superfluous: in many contexts the distorting models still provide us with the best explanation of the behavior of water and their explanatory success depends precisely on the fact that these models are highly idealized and distorting.
But in fact we have granted much too much to the objection, for we do not actually possess a perfectly accurate and complete quantum mechanical model of wave or diffusion phenomena. This brings us to the second issue-the foundationalist assumption that there exist perfectly accurate, fundamental models, constructed with the help of our most fundamental theories, underlying the idealized higher--level models we use in practice. I now want to challenge this assumption. First, quantum mechanics has its own limits in scope and accuracy-current quantum mechanics, too, distorts and is not the final and correct theory of the world. Second and more importantly, even if we were to belief that present day quantum theory was exactly correct wherever it can be applied, it still would not provide us with models of the macro--phenomena at issue here. We have so far imagined that we were somehow given a quantum--mechanical model of macroscopic bodies of water, but that is of course only an impossible fiction. To actually construct any such model, we would have to solve the Schrödinger equation for on the order of 10 25 variables-something that is impossible to do and far beyond our computational capacities.
At this point one common reply is to insist that even if it is impossible actually to solve the Schrödinger equation for macroscopic systems, the theory nevertheless provides us with models of arbitrary complexity. The equation defines a class of models, many of which we of course never construct explicitly. Indeed, any physical theory has many, many more models than the ones scientists have actually constructed and actually used. But is it not correct that the Schrödinger Equation has many more models than the ones actually constructed by us? And if we allow that the Schrödinger equation has models for arbitrarily complex initial conditions, does it not follow that among the equation's models there will be some with initial conditions representing the state of the body of water? This reply, however, trades on an ambiguity in the term 'model'. There are two quite different senses of model between which we have to distinguish carefully. On the one hand, there is the notion of model as representation, according to which a structure is a model of a thing just in case it is used to represent that thing. That is, something is a model of some object or system in virtue of representing the object or system. And if van Fraassen is right, then nothing is a model in this sense without actually and as a matter of fact being used as a representation-the existence of a certain structural relation between the model and the target system is not enough for it to be a representation of the system. On the other hand, a structure is a model of a set of sentences, in the logical or model--theoretic sense of 'model', just in case it satisfies that set of sentences or the set of sentences are true in that structure. A linguistic description of a theory serves to specify the theory's model--theoretic models in the sense in which a set of equations specifies the set of its own solutions. This second notion of model is not an intentional notion. All that is required for a structure to be a model in this sense, is that a mapping from the structure to the set of sentences exists such that all the sentences in the set come out true; it need not be the case that there is a user who takes the set of sentences to be true in that particular structure.
If we accept van Fraassen's account of representation and "there is no such thing as representation apart from or independent of our practice" (2008, 258) , then it does not follow from the fact that a set of equations has solutions or models in the non--intentional, model--theoretic sense that exist all along even without us using or being able to construct these solutions, that these solutions are also models in the first, representational and intentional sense. Recall van Fraassen's "Hauptsatz": "There is no representation except in the sense that some things are used, made, or taken, to represent things as thus and so." Thus solutions to equations that we have not found or constructed cannot be used to represent anything, simply because we cannot use anything that we do not have or do not even know The latter passage occurs within the context of a discussion of Nancy Cartwright's view that there are models in science that have an existence that is in some sense independent of the theories with the help of which they are constructed. Thus, van Fraassen here appears to be guilty of not carefully differentiating between the two notions of model that I distinguished above: the solutions of the equations are model--theoretic models but not thereby automatically also representational models. Even though Cartwright is clearly interested in models as representational structures, van Fraassen invokes the model--theoretic notion of model in his response to her. Yet-putting the point without using the term 'model'-the fact that we can formally define a class of structures that satisfy a set of sentence says nothing about the representational use to which we might put those members of the class that we have in fact explicitly constructed. And van Fraassen himself elsewhere in the book appears to stress this very point:
There is no such thing as representation apart from or independent of our practice. So how can we say something like "this theory accurately represents that bacterial growth phenomenon" although the relevant model was never constructed and the bacterial colony was certainly not Thus, van Fraassen apparently wants to be committed to two ideas that seem to be in tension with each other: on the one hand, the idea that "we would like to say" that if a theory formally has an appropriate solution then it does represent the phenomenon in question even if the solution has not been explicitly constructed; and on the other hand, the idea that there is no representation independent of its being used as such and that "there is nothing useful to be found in 2--place structure--phenomenon relations alone when we try to That is, offering a theory amounts to offering a range of model--theoretic models-of mathematical structures that we could use to represent phenomena. And a theory represents a particular phenomenon within its domain adequately, just in case there is a structure among the range defined by the theory such that were we to use this structures as representation for that phenomenon, then the phenomenon could be embedded into the model.
There is a certain irony in the fact that van Fraassen appears to be driven to appeal to counterfactuals here, given his well--known view that counterfactuals are inherently and irreducibly context--dependent. What are the truth--conditions of claims of the form 'if we were to use a structure s to represent phenomenon p, then p would be embeddable in s'?
The problem is that it is not clear, independent of our actual use of a structure to represent a phenomenon, that there is a unique answer as to how the structure would be used to represent the phenomenon and what the appropriate embedding relation would be were we to use the structure as representation. And again it is van Fraassen himself who has convincingly shown, for reasons having to do with Putnam's model--theoretic argument, why there is no unique embedding relation independently of our use of a given structure.
In that context, van Fraassen stresses precisely the point I wanted to emphasize here: That we have to be careful about an "illegitimate slippage from 'there exists' to 'we have'" (van In the next subsection I will summarize some of the considerations leading up to Putnam's argument that are relevant to our discussion here and which will serve to further amplify the claim that the notion of representation is essentially tied to a representations' use.
Structures and Use
Physical theories provide us with mathematical representations of phenomena-that is, with abstract structural models. Successful theories, it seems, provide us with models that in some sense resemble the phenomena they represent. One issue in this context is the one that divides scientific realists and empiricists and concerns the question whether we can have good reasons to believe that successful models resemble the physical systems they represent in their entirety or only with respect to their observable substructures. This is not an issue I will be pursuing here. A conceptually prior question is what kind of resemblance can be possible at all between abstract mathematical models and concrete goings on in the world. The most plausible answer to this questions is: structural resemblance. That is, successful theories provide us with models that are structurally similar to the phenomena they represent. This view has a long tradition in the philosophy of science, dating back at least to the Bildtheorie of Heinrich Hertz and Boltzmann and is expressed, for example in Hertz's famous dictum: "We form for ourselves inner apparent images or symbols of external objects, and we do this in such a manner that the necessary consequents of the images in thought are always the images of the necessary consequents in nature of the objects pictured." 4
In a recent paper, Roman Frigg (Frigg 2010) has presented an argument against the structuralist view that scientific representation, at least in the physical sciences, is structural representation and for the view that the model systems at the heart of a physical theory ought to be thought of as hypothetical or imagined concrete physical systems. Frigg points out that in order to make sense of a structural resemblance between a model and its target one has to assume that the target also exemplifies a certain structure but, Frigg argues, "this cannot be had without bringing non--structural features into play." (Frigg 2010, 254) Frigg's argument for this claim proceeds in two steps. First, he argues that since structures are abstract, structural claims about a physical system cannot be true unless some non--structural claims are true as well. Second, he argues that the "descriptions we use to ground structural claims are almost never in fact true descriptions of the intended target system" (Ibid.) From which he concludes that "the descriptions that ground structural claims (almost always) fail to be descriptions of the intended target system. Instead, they describe a hypothetical system distinct from the target system." (Ibid.) Thus, Frigg wants to conclude, theoretical models cannot merely be mathematical structures but are concrete, albeit merely imagined or hypothetical physical systems.
Frigg's second step begins by echoing a point also made by van Fraassen and to which we will return below: that structural resemblance is possible only between two structures and hence that the subject of the representation also has to be depicted by us as structured in a certain way. Frigg then argues that such a depiction cannot be merely structural but has to be concretely 'fitted out.' (For example, that three iron rods can be taken to exhibit a certain (abstract) ordering relation is true only in virtue, say, of the rods having different lengths.) So far so good. But what Frigg wants to show is not that a structured depiction of the phenomena is accompanied by a more concrete description, but that the theoretical models we employ are hypothetical concrete physical systems. And the fact that any structure attributed to the phenomena needs to be embedded into a concrete description of the phenomena does not imply that theoretical models, too, need to be concretely fitted out. The missing step in the argument is meant to be provided by the observation that the concrete descriptions of the phenomena are almost never true descriptions, which is supposed to make the introduction of hypothetical systems necessary.
I have two worries about this step in the argument, however. First, it is not clear why the fact that the descriptions are false implies that they "fail to be descriptions of the target system." More plausibly, it seems to me, one might hold that even a false description of a system is a descriptions of that system-it just may be a descriptions that we do not take to be completely true but that nevertheless plays a useful role in our understanding of the system. Consider as an analogy a caricature that depicts Barack Obama as having huge My second worry is that even if we were to grant that an idealized description of a target system required that we introduce a hypothetical or fictional system that the idealized description truthfully describes, it does not follow that we also need to think of theoretical models as hypothetical concrete physical systems. Frigg proposes that we simply identify the hypothetical systems which satisfy the idealized prepared description of a physical system with the "model systems" of our theories. But this presupposes that our theories imply or at least are logically strictly compatible with the prepared descriptions of the phenomena, for otherwise our theories could not be true of the putative hypothetical system. By contrast, if rather more plausibly we require only that our theoretical models approximately resemble our representations of the target system, then the hypothetical physical systems that would concretely realize the structures of a class of theoretical models cannot be identical to the hypothetical systems that satisfy an idealized depiction of the phenomena. But if we need to distinguish between a prepared description of the phenomena and the theoretical models that are meant to approximately resemble the former, we still need an argument for why we need to think of both kinds of models and not merely of the prepared descriptions as hypothetical concrete physical systems.
Frigg does offer a second argument in support of the claim that model systems cannot be purely structural appealing to the fact that "scientists often talk about model systems as if they were physical things" (2010, 253) . This is surely right, but it is unclear what lesson we should draw from this observation. One option might be to argue that this is merely points to a surface feature of scientific practice and ought not to be understood literally. Another possibility is that what scientists understand by a model system or a theoretical representation differs widely from discipline to discipline, from context to context and even from scientist to scientist. In some contexts, especially in the more fundamental theories of physics, theoretical models might consist of purely structural, mathematical representations of the phenomena, in other contexts the models might be concrete yet imagined natural systems. One might even grant that the structural models in physics may sometimes be concretely 'fitted out' for didactic reasons or because physicists might find it fruitful to think of a concrete analogy of the system represented, even though their commitment is only to a structural resemblance between the theoretical models and the systems modeled. Perhaps the planetary model of the atom is an example of this kind, which may be best thought of as involving two kinds of model-a purely mathematical the myriad possible mappings from a model onto a phenomenon one particular mapping as the intended one, with the possibility that our model turns out not to resemble the phenomenon under the intended mapping, as we would like to conclude in the case of the sheet of paper. If there is no additional constraint that allows us to distinguish permissible from impermissible mappings, then the claim that there exists an appropriate structural resemblance between a model and some physical system turns out to be nothing more than a claim about the number of elements of the model and the system. David Lewis replied to Putnam's argument by arguing that there is an additional constraint on the mappings given by preferred or natural divisions and relations among objects in the world. A representation is successful, according to Lewis' proposal, not merely if the physical system represented can be structured in some way that is isomorphic to the representation, but only if the representation is approximately isomorphic to the structure given by the natural kinds out of which the system is composed. That is, according to Lewis, nature itself has a preferred or natural relational structure and a theory's models are intended to represent this structure as accurately as possible. But aside from worries about the metaphysical commitments implied by Lewis's reply, it is not clear how general his strategy can be applied, since the kinds invoked by all but our most fundamental scientific theories are not good candidates for being natural kinds.
Putnam's own solution to his puzzle is to advocate a deflationary view of reference combined with the view that our use of our representations fixes their meaning (see also Frisch 1999) . Van Fraassen (2008) agrees at least with the second part of this and further amplifies it as follows. Rejecting Lewis's anti--nominalism appears to leave us with a problem: how can an abstract mathematical structure resemble something in nature that is not abstract? We said that the appropriate resemblance relation between the mathematical models of our theories and the phenomena they are intended to represent is one of structural resemblance. But if we reject the idea that the world itself exhibits a preferred relational structure given by the natural kinds, then what are the structures in nature that our scientific models are intended to resemble? Van Fraassen's answer to this problem once more emphasizes the role of the user in representation. Theoretical models, he maintains, are intended to resemble data models of the phenomena, which are constructed through the "selective relevant depiction of the phenomena by the user of the theory required for the possibility of representation of the phenomenon." (2008, 253) .
That is, the phenomena, which our theoretical models are meant to represent are structured by us relative to our interests: "the phenomenon, what it is like taken by itself, does not determine which structures are data models for it-that depends on our selective attention to the phenomenon." (2008, 254) The overall picture, then, that emerges consists of two stages. We represent a phenomenon by what van Fraassen calls a 'data model' of the phenomenon and which provides a structured depiction of the phenomenon; a successful theory provides us with theoretical models into which data models of the phenomena within the theory's domain can be approximately embedded, where it is our use of the theoretical models that singles out the intended embedding. Thus, the user enters the account of scientific representation at two places: first, in the depiction of a phenomenon as structured in a certain way; and second, in taking a model to represent the phenomenon, depicted as thus structured.
One might object that in requiring of our theories' models only that data models can be approximately embedded into them we are committing ourselves to van Fraassen's empiricism. Yet the account of representation is independent of constructive empiricism.
Someone who takes theories not merely to represent observational substructures of a phenomenon could replace van Fraassen's notion of a data model with a notion of phenomenological model that includes in its depiction of a phenomenon also an unobservable substructure not represented in the data model. One might also worry with Cartwright that the first step in depicting a physical system is not yet a mathematically precise data model, which often already involves a significant amount of theoretical analysis, but rather a still somewhat informal prepared description. The resulting picture is somewhat more complicated than the one suggested by van Fraassen and includes a prepared description, data models, phenomenological models, and theoretical models. We test our theories by examining whether a data model can be approximately embedded into a theoretical model; if the answer is 'yes', then this provides us with reasons to believe that the theoretical model structurally resembles the phenomenon as formally depicted in the phenomenological model, and that our initial prepared description has proven itself.
Another worry is that on this account it may seem that we lose the ultimate link of our theories to reality, since we never appear to get beyond the phenomena as described by us (either in a data model or in a phenomenological model). Van Fraassen reply to this objection is to argue that the worry disappears once we appreciate that for us there is no difference between the question whether a theory fits a phenomenon and the question whether a theory fits that phenomenon as represented by us. That the two questions are equivalent for us, he maintains, is a pragmatic tautology. Thus, the gap that the objection tries to exploit cannot be coherently expressed by us. Of course we can ask if someone else's structured depiction of a phenomenon is adequate or appropriate. But we cannot do this by contrasting the depiction by the phenomenon with the phenomenon itself, but only by comparing the depiction with the phenomenon as represented by us.
Anti--fundamentalism
For our present purposes the crucial point is that considerations from Putnam's model--theoretic argument further amplify the pragmatic dimension in the notion of representation and provide additional support for van Fraassen's Hauptsatz according to which a structure is a representation only if it is used as a representation. But if all this is correct, then it seems to follow that the threat of Putnam's argument can only be avoided for structures that we are actually using as models and this conclusion seems highly counterintuitive. In accepting Newtonian physics, say, are we not committed to the claim that the theory successfully applies to planetary systems yet to be discovered and systems of billiard balls never explicitly modeled? Any theory's domain, it seems, extends well beyond the class of phenomena for which we have actually constructed models. How, then, can we combine this seemingly obvious point with the lessons of Putnam's argument?
It seems to me that we need to distinguish carefully between the kind of example van Fraassen himself mentions when he discusses this issue-that of a colony of bacteria located somewhere in Antarctica long before the first humans appeared on Earth-and the example we discussed above: a putative quantum mechanical micro--model for the macro--behavior of water. 5 Van Fraassen asks whether we can say that a theory of exponential 5 Van Fraassen himself (2008, 25--6 ) discusses the putative worry as to how our models might be able "to represent something that has not yet entered our acquaintance". I agree with van Fraassen that this worry does not genuinely arise. My worry here is, as it were, the mirror--image of this: How can we represent anything with models that have not yet entered our acquaintance? growth adequately represents the evolution of this colony, even though by hypothesis no model for this particular phenomenon was ever offered. His reply, as we have seen above, is to appeal to a counterfactual account of empirical adequacy: the theory is adequate if among the solutions to its equations is one defining a structure that would satisfy the relevant constraints on adequacy if it were used to represent the colony's evolution. The worry raised by Putnam's argument is whether this counterfactual has reasonably well--defined truth conditions. I want to suggest that the answer is 'yes' in the present case, since scientists actually and as a matter of fact use models of bacterial colonies to represent their growth and arguably this practice sufficiently constrains how we would represent the Antarctic colony were we to do so. That is, scientists actually depict bacterial colonies through data models that are appropriate for a representation of the colonies' evolution in terms of exponential growth models; and scientists actually use the latter models to represent bacterial colonies. Arguably, this practice sufficiently constrains what it would be to provide a data model of the Antarctic colony-that is, what it would be for us to selectively structure the phenomenon in a way that is relevant to exponential growth theory. As van Fraassen correctly emphasizes, however, the notion of relevance here is relative to a user and a specific context of use:
There is nothing in an abstract structure itself that can determine that it is the relevant data model, to be matched by the theory. A particular data model is relevant because it was constructed on the basis of results gathered in a certain way, selected by specific criteria of relevance, on certain occasions, in a practical experimental or observational setting, designed for that purpose. In response one might try to appeal to our actual practices of modeling simple microscopic systems quantum mechanically as providing the relevant constraints, but implicit in such an appeal would be a commitment to natural kinds-a commitment that independently of our actual practices of modeling macroscopic bodies of water in certain practical and experimental settings there is a preferred and privileged microscopic relational structure that would be the correct phenomenological model for an application of quantum mechanics to the system. Contrary to the nominalism defended by van
Fraassen one would have to be committed to the idea that for each phenomenon taken by itself there is a determinate answer which structures are appropriate data--or phenomenological models for it, independently of "our decisions in attending to certain aspects, to represent them in certain ways and to a certain extent". (2008, 254) .
Conclusion
If the pragmatic and structuralist account of representation outlined and defended here is correct, then this has far--reaching implications for how we think about scientific theorizing.
First, the view undermines what Cartwright has called "the vending machine view" of theories, according to which the representational content of a theory is given simply by
